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Abstract
The central issue of the wide literature about the endowment effect is the search for an explanation of the fact 
that the selling price of a good will be higher than that at which a person is willing to buy that same good, 
once they own it. The experimental evidence is not unanimous in replicating the results found by  Kahneman 
et al. (1990 and 1991). The challenge is that of disentangling the several determinants that may be at work in 
generating the final effect, as the loss aversion is not considered the only explanation. 
We dig deeper by examining two of these likely determinants which remain understudied: the first is the 
impact that the amount of time of ownership can have on the endowment effect. The second is the type of  
item (non-material good and exchange goods) used to test the effect. Through an online questionnaire we 
investigate  these  aspects  by using three  different  goods:  a  mug,  an Amazon Gift  Card and a  quarterly  
subscription to Spotify. We also test whether the endowment effect occurs in different time scenarios, that is  
if participants imagine to own the good for one day, one week or one month. 
We find that  the endowment effect clearly appears for all types of goods while less clear results take shape  
when considering the duration of the ownership.
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Abstract
The central issue of the wide literature about the endowment effect is the search for an
explanation of the fact that the selling price of a good will be higher than that at which a
person is willing to buy that same good, once they own it. The experimental evidence is
not unanimous in replicating the results found by Kahneman et al. (1990 and 1991). The
challenge is that of disentangling the several determinants that may be at work in generating
the final effect, as the loss aversion is not considered the only explanation. We dig deeper
by examining two of these likely determinants which remain understudied: the first is the
impact that the amount of time of ownership can have on the endowment effect. The second
is the type of item (non-material good and exchange goods) used to test the effect. Through
an online questionnaire we investigate these aspects by using three different goods: a mug,
an Amazon Gift Card and a quarterly subscription to Spotify. We also test whether the
endowment effect occurs in different time scenarios, that is if participants imagine to own the
good for one day, one week or one month. We find that the endowment effect clearly appears
for all types of goods while less clear results take shape when considering the duration of
the ownership.
JEL Classification: D12, D91.
Keywords: WTA/WTP gap; endowment effect; ownership experience, fungible goods,
non-material goods, exchange goods.
1 Introduction
The endowment effect is one of the building blocks that have been part of behavioral economics
since its very beginning. While in the neoclassic economic theory, ownership of an item does not
have any influence on its evaluation, research has nevertheless experimentally verified that this
may not be always the case. In particular, this type of effect has emerged from the observation
that people give higher importance to what they own and they are going to value a good more
than when they do not own a good and have to buy it. For this reason, a significant divergence
between what people are willing to pay (WTP) to buy the good and what they are willing to
accept to sell it (WTA) is to be expected.
Starting from Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990 and 1991) a burgeoning literature has
started to go deeper into the study of this effect but mainly identifying it as a consequence of
loss aversion. According to this interpretation, the sale of an object is perceived by the seller
as a loss with respect to their reference point, while the purchase is perceived by the buyer -
who does not yet own the good and therefore does not incorporate it into their reference point
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- as a gain. Thus, if individuals are loss-averse, their tendency will be to value the objects they
consider selling more than they value the objects they consider buying. This implies that the
selling price of a good will be higher than that at which a person is willing to buy that same
good. Similarly, as Gal (2006) argues, it is the propensity to remain within the boundaries of the
status quo that generates the endowment effect, whose psychological explanation is grounded in
the propensity for inertia.
The roots of the endowment effect, however, are not limited to the loss aversion alone; other
possible explanations have been provided, as the initial insights of prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) and subsequent models of reference dependence (such as the status quo bias,
see Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) have since been extended in various directions. For exam-
ple, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) hypothesized that the reference point is determined not so much
by current ownership of a good, but more importantly by expectations about expected future
outcomes. From their perspective, loss aversion is not the main determinant of the endowment
effect - although they do not rule out that it plays an important role in many other market
phenomena - but rather the possibility of participating (or not participating) in a market for the
asset owned.
From a methodological point of view, experiments have been used from the beginning to
address the issue. The first work in this direction is in Knetsch (1989), showing the endowment
effect in a basic experimental context: participants are randomly endowed with one of two
available goods having approximately the same value and then they are given the opportunity to
exchange the possessed good with the other one. In this situation we should expect a number of
transactions involving about half of the subjects but the number observed is actually significantly
lower, giving a possible confirmation of the existence of an endowment effect. Later, Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler, (1990) refines the investigation by studying this phenomenon in a series of
8 experiments in which assets can be exchanged for money and presenting evidence suggesting
that people’s preferences depend on their reference positions.
However, these experimental results are not universally accepted. Plott and Zeiler (2005,
2007) have argued that the effect found in these studies is not evidence of reference point de-
pendent preferences. While Knetsch, and many of those who followed him, interpreted the
exchange asymmetry as evidence of a special form of preferences related to loss aversion, Plott
and Zeiler tested an alternative explanation by postulating that these asymmetries were the re-
sult of subjects’ misunderstandings and misconceptions regarding the nature of the experimental
task (primarily related to the complexity of the Becker-deGroot-Marschak method used to elicit
preferences) as well as biases introduced by the experimental procedures. To test this conjecture,
Plott and Zeiler conducted a series of experiments altering the traditional experimental design
in an attempt to reduce both confusion and procedure-driven influences. This allowed them to
demonstrate that asymmetries can be made to appear or disappear in a given group of subjects
by modifying the procedures used. These works have in turn been criticized (see e.g. Fehr,
Hakimov, Kübler, 2015) and the debate is ongoing.
In all classical experiments, the endowment effect follows from the attribution of ownership
of a good, interpreting this phenomenon as a consequence of the loss aversion one would suffer by
depriving oneself of the good. In this scheme, however, the two factors of ownership attribution
and loss aversion become confused. Morewedge et al. (2009) conducted two experiments in which
they attempted to distinguish between these two factors by separating the seller/buyer conditions
from the owner/non-owner conditions. In accordance with the classical demonstrations of the
endowment effect, they acknowledge that a lower value is attached to a mug by non-owner buyers
rather than owner sellers. In the same way, when the roles are reversed, that is buyers become
owners and sellers become non owners, it is found that the effect does not occur suggesting
that ownership and not loss aversion causes the endowment effect in the standard experimental
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paradigm.
A second source of confusion is that legal ownership and possession tend to coincide in the
classical experimental design. However, recent literature on the endowment effect has suggested
that actual legal ownership may not be necessary to cause the endowment effect. For example,
Reb and Connolly (2007) perform an experiment in which ownership and possession are sepa-
rated. The results suggest a significant effect of possession, but not ownership, on the monetary
valuation of the object. Focusing more in depth into the characteristics of the ownership, Bagga
et al. (2020) give recent evidence on the fact that also ”‘non-ownership”’, such as rent and
borrowing can give rise to some sort of endowment effect. They find that what is relevant is the
psychological ownership rather than just the legal possession.
Indeed, further attempts to go deeper in the search for the ultimate reasons underlying the
endowment effect come from psychological research: one such directions concerns the fact that
people may overlap their choice with their self. The so called self hypothesis gives evidence of the
fact that the item is associated with the idea people have of themselves, that is the ownership of
an item creates a linkage with the self of the owner so that they are going to value the item more
not because they feel pain in giving it away but because they the item is “theirs” (Gawrosnki et
al. 2007, Morowedge, 2009).
Chatterjee, Irmak, and Rose (2013) and Alexopoulos, Šimleša, and Francis (2015) employ
the concepts of loss aversion as well as ownership to propose explanations of the phenomenon
through models based on self-improvement in response to threat. Specifically, they argue that
the endowment effect is a response to a threat of the self that arisies in the case of selling
an owned object, when fear of the potential loss of the self-associated object is experienced.
Thus, the endowment effect is the result of both the object-self association created by possession
(ownership profile) and the consideration of selling the self-associated object (loss aversion). The
threat for the self created by these two elements, in turn motivates self-improvement by assigning
a higher valuation to the given object. Within this stream of research some papers also explore
the role of emotions as determinants of the effect; for example, Martinez et al. (2011) show that
two decision-related emotions, regret and disappointment, can have distinct effects on object
valuation.
The endowment effect can also be triggered by unexpected stimuli. Building on the idea that
perceived control is a key driver of psychological ownership, Brasel and Gips (2014) study the
effect of various types of computer interfaces (touchpads, touchscreens, ...) and show that an
endowment effect is more likely when subjects also own the device used: selecting a product on a
proprietary device is closer to touching the product itself, increasing its psychological ownership.
One crucial area, which has been largely neglected, has to do with the time of possession:
in the original framework the endowment effect should occur immediately after coming into
possession of the good. This idea is however challenged only by Strahilevitz and Loewenstein
(1998). Across 4 different experiments they provide evidence (1) that valuation increases with
the duration of possession, and (2) that past possession experiences also influence the valuation
of the good. Psychological adaptation appears to play a role in generating a greater endowment
effect over time. Also Wang, Ong, and Tan (2015) examined how an object’s ownership history -
which captures the origins of how an object is obtained - affects its valuation. In their experiment,
they find a significant effect in treatments involving various sequences of acquisition/loss of asset
ownership. No other studies, to our knowledge, further investigate the “time” dimension of the
endowment effect.
As clearly pointed out in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), one consequence of the
endowment effect being caused by loss aversion is that this should not occur for exchange goods.
This view is partially at odds with Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg (1996) who show - in an
experiment in which value is induced on tokens by means of lotteries - that the endowment effect
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also occurs for exchange goods as long as their value is uncertain. Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and
van Dijk (2005) reinforce this view by investigating curiosity effects: if curiosity can only be
satisfied by withholding the exchange good, then this can lead to the emergence of disparities
between purchase and sale prices.
An indirect argument in support of the hypothesis that the endowment effect does not occur
for exchange goods is provided by Novemsky and Kahneman (2005), who start from the idea that
the “intentions” of the agents define the nature of an asset as consumption good or exchange
good. Such intentions can inhibit (in the case of exchange goods) or produce (for consumption
goods) loss aversion. Therefore, if loss aversion is an essential element for the emergence of the
endowment effect, it must be concluded that this should not occur for exchange goods. More
recently, Svirsky (2014) addresses this issue performing an experiment with coins, chocolate
coins, and chocolate coins described as tokens and finding no endowment effect for either money
or a consumer good labeled as an exchange good.1
The role of the type of item in the endowment effect has also been studied by Jaeger et al.
(2020), who consider, using the time-shifted rationality approach, whether the effect can vary
and to which degree according to the item considered. They find that the endowment effect
can actually vary in magnitude across item, being for the large part due to the evolutionary
mechanisms.
Having briefly sketched the quite relevant and wide literature on the endowment effect, we
can sum up by saying that even though many different determinants of the effect have been
considered so far, some of them such as the role of time since possession as well as the type of
item traded are still under-researched. Our paper is an attempt to fill this gap by examining
whether the endowment effect is going to occur considering different periods of possession as well
as different items: a mug, an Amazon gift card and a full subscription to the Spotify streaming
service. Through the submission of an online questionnaire we are able to test whether the
endowment effect is present not only right after “owning” the good but also whether the effect
is still present after one hour, one week and one month.
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents the aims of the study, Section 3 describes
in detail the questionnaire and Section 4 the subject pool. Section 5 offers some comments on
the results obtained while Section 6 concludes.
2 Aims of the study
We build on previous literature related to two strands of research in the area of the endowment
effect: (1) the dependence on the type of asset (tangible goods vs. non-material goods vs.
exchange goods) and (2) the effect of prolonged ownership (instant vs. long-run endowment
effect).
Concerning the first issue (dependence on the type of asset), there are two aspects that must
be discussed, regarding exchange goods and non-material goods, respectively.
The emergence of an endowment effect in the case of exchange goods is still debated. In
experiments reported in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), subjects are endowed with
induced value tokens that can be exchanged. No endowment effect was found in this situation,
prompting the authors to conclude that the endowment effect does not occur for exchange goods.
This fact also appears to be consistent with the loss aversion/reference point adaptation theory:
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) ascribe it to the lack of loss aversion with respect to
1One attempt to resolve this dispute comes from an adversarial collaborative project (see Bateman et al., 2005)
in which two different hypotheses - regarding whether or not loss aversion emerges in the case of exchange goods
- are tested in a large experiment consisting of 10 treatments: the results, although not conclusive, suggest that
the WTA/WTP disparity emerges even in the presence of exchange goods.
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money exchanged for other goods in a normal transaction.2 As we saw in the introduction, this
view is confirmed by some studies (e.g. Svirsky, 2013) and disputed by others (e.g. van Dijk
and van Knippenberg, 1996, specifically with respect to the case of exchange goods whose value
is uncertain). Despite some attempts to settle the controversy (e.g. Bateman et al, 2005) the
evidence is insufficient to end the debate.
The second aspect regards non-material goods (as opposed to tangible goods), which is a
class of assets for which the endowment effect has not been sufficiently studied.
As we have seen above, legal ownership (intended as the attribution of the right of ownership)
and possession of the asset (intended as physical possession) have different consequences for
the endowment effect and can be treated separately. In doing so, Reb and Connolly (2007)
document that it is primarily physical possession and not legal ownership that is the cause of the
endowment effect. But if the feeling of possession requires tangibility, then non-material goods
require additional attention: in this case, it is possible that the endowment effect does not occur
(or occurs only slightly) if material possession is the main driver of the phenomenon.
We investigate the case of exchange goods by referring to an Amazon Gift Card, which gives
the owner the right to make purchases on the Amazon platform up to a predetermined amount.
Concerning non-material goods, we consider a quarterly subscription to Spotify, a popular online
music streaming service.
The following questions relating to the issue of the dependence of the endowment effect on
the type of asset arise from the above analysis:
a) Is there indeed no endowment effect in the case of an exchange good comparable to legal
tender (but different from money), as postulated by standard theory?
b) Does the endowment effect occur in the case of non-material assets, for which physical
possession cannot be ascribed?
Regarding the second issue (effect of prolonged ownership), we start from the theoretical
explanation based on the concept of loss aversion and adaptation to new reference points. Tra-
ditionally, the literature on this topic refers to an instantaneous endowment effect, meaning that
the adaptation to the new reference point brought about by obtaining ownership of the asset
occurs immediately. On the other hand, it is possible that, while part of the adaptation occurs
quickly, the process is more prolonged in time and therefore a greater endowment effect occurs
after longer time intervals.
Indeed, as mentioned above, Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) show that the endowment
effect does not end instantaneously after the acquisition of ownership of the asset and it is affected
by prolonged ownership. In their experiment, prolonged possession refers to time periods of 20
minutes in one study and one hour in the other, but they do not clarify whether longer durations
can further influence the endowment effect. Indeed as they themselves acknowledge, although
the effect of such short differences in ownership duration attests to the strength of the effect, it is
not possible to generalize the results to much longer ownership durations out of their experiment.
We intend to add to this issue and try to answer the following questions:
c) Does the WTA continue to increase after periods of time of one day, one week or longer?
d) After how long (if so) does prolonged possession cease to have an effect on WTA?
e) Does this adaptive process lead the valuation of the asset to gradually converge to a new
equilibrium?
To answer the five questions we resort to an online questionnaire whose details will be pre-
sented in the following section. The study has been pre-registered on aspredicted.org (#71055,
20 July 2021).
2Experimental support for this hypothesis is also found in Novemsky and Kahneman (2005)
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3 The Questionnaire
Data are collected via a questionnaire administered through the QualtricsXM platform and con-
sisting of the following steps:
1. Information and consent form.
2. Instructions and comprehension check. A comprehension check question is introduced
to familiarize participants with the ”multiple list method” we use to elicit values, and to
minimize noise due to confusion.
3. Main treatment. The main treatment comes in five different versions, corresponding to
the five experimental conditions whose details will be discussed below.
4. Attention level check. The verification of the level of attention is introduced to en-
sure minimal control over the quality of the responses collected. It demonstrated some
effectiveness, having resulted in the cancellation of a percentage of responses around 15%.
5. Final survey. The final survey is divided into two parts. A first part collects information
on some consumption habits relevant to the questionnaire, while a second part collects
impressions on the effectiveness of the questionnaire design.
The estimated duration of the questionnaire is 6 minutes and the remuneration is £0.80
(or £8.00 per hour, equivalent to e9.4 or $11.2 at the exchange rates in effect at the time the
questionnaire is administered).
In the Appendix are shown all the screenshots related to the Buyer condition followed by
example screenshots related to other conditions, so as to facilitate the comparison.
3.1 Treatment conditions
The questionnaire has a between-subject design for the variable ”duration of ownership” and a
within-subject design for the variable ”nature of the asset”. In total we have five conditions,
differing for the duration of ownership described.
1. Buyer condition: No ownership. Subjects are presented with a scenario in which they
are shown an asset and have the possibility to get such asset or alternatively to get some
money.
2. Seller condition: Ownership. Subjects are presented with a scenario in which they are
given an asset and have the possibility to keep such asset or to trade it with alternative
amounts of money. Four specifications of the seller condition are considered.
2a Immediate: The choice between keeping or trading is to be taken immediately after
becoming the owner of the asset.
2b Day: Choice to be taken one day after becoming the owner of the asset.
2c Week: Choice to be taken one week after becoming the owner of the asset.
2d Month: Choice to be taken one month after becoming the owner of the asset.
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Each participant is assigned to one of the five conditions.
Regarding the within-subject component related to the nature of the asset, each subject
is asked questions regarding each of three asset types: tangible good (represented by a mug),
non-material (represented by a quarterly subscription to Spotify), and medium of exchange (rep-
resented by an Amazon gift card with a nominal value of $100). We adopt a counterbalancing
design, such that the order of appearance of the three asset types (tangible, non-material, ex-
change) is randomized for every subject, to control for possible order effects.
3.2 Conditions implementation
Each asset is briefly introduced and accompanied by a picture. We keep the differences among
conditions to a minimum, while aiming to induce the necessary identification with the different
scenarios. In the baseline conditions (Buyer and Immediate Seller) - by which we intend to
measure the usual WTA-WTP gap - the differences are limited to one word in the description of
the context (“You have been shown . . . ” vs “You have been given . . . ”) and the verbs describing
the possible actions (“Get the asset” and “Get the money” vs “Keep” and “Trade”) – see e.g.
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Comparison between the buyer and the seller conditions
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Figure 2: ”Day” condition
In the “protracted ownership” conditions (Day, Week and Month) we add the sentence “You
keep it for one day/week/month, in which you have the opportunity to observe it at your leisure
(without using it), and imagine how and where to use it” in order to give the necessary salience
to the temporal framing of the decision to be made. In addition to presenting the imaginary
context, we also ask subjects to pause and think about the situation for a few seconds (10, 20 or
30 seconds, in the three conditions Day, Week or Month, respectively). Although this pause is
not mandatory, we believe that it might help the process of identification which is crucial in an
incentive-free environment such as this one (see e.g. Figure 2, showing the phrasing chosen for
the Day condition).
3.3 Data collection
Data are collected using a two-step ”multiple list method” (MPL). We decided in favor of this
method, as opposed to the alternative of asking subjects to directly provide a value for the
goods, which is commonly used with incentive schemes à la Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM).
The main disadvantage of MPL is that it takes more time and effort from the subjects: in our
setup, each valuation requires participants to tick 11-12 boxes, while a direct revelation would
only ask participants to type a single number. On the other hand, since there is no clear incentive
scheme in the questionnaire (given that participation is paid at a flat rate), we felt that it would
be easier for subjects to achieve the desired goal (i.e., to assign a value to the assets) with a
mechanism steering them towards it through successive steps. In addition, our decision is also
supported by the results of Brebner and Sonnemans (2018) showing that the MPL and the BDM
methods produce approximately the same valuations of WTA and WTP in incentivized contexts
and suggesting that“when only few valuations with a relatively low resolution are needed, MPL
seems to be a practical choice”.
In our questionnaire, in the first stage of each question, participants must choose whether to
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get the asset or to get the money (in the Buyer condition; to keep or to trade the asset in the
Seller condition) for five different amounts of money, which remain unchanged across the five
treatment conditions. Once the first choice is made, we ask them to refine their choices in a
smaller interval (see Figures 3 and 4).
Figure 3: First stage Multiple List for a mug in the Buyer condition
Figure 4: Second stage, 6-9 interval, Multiple List for a mug in the Buyer condition
Values are elicited in dollars within different intervals and with different steps for the three
assets:
Mug. Values in 0 − 18. Steps: 3 in the first stage and 0.5 in the second stage.
Spotify subscription. Values in 0 − 30. Steps: 5 in the first stage and 1 in the second
stage.
Amazon gift card. Values in 40 − 100. Steps: 10 in the first stage and 2 in the second
stage.
Finally, before closing the questionnaire we administer a short survey with two purposes:
- Collect data on the habit of using the online services involved in the survey (Spotify and
Amazon) to check for a possible consequential effect (this part is mandatory).
- Collect impressions on the effectiveness of the framing used to set up the questions and in
particular on the part regarding the duration of ownership (this part is voluntary).
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4 Subject pool
The questionnaire was administered through the Prolific platform between 12 and 28 July 2021.
Overall a total of 516 subjects participated.3 The following tables illustrate the demographic
characteristics of the pool.
In addition to balancing by gender, we also imposed a certain allocation balance to the various
conditions:
The subjects consisted in individuals whose first language was English, because we wanted
to make sure that there was a full understanding of the questions and their logic. The current
country of residence of participants is shown in the following table:
3Of these, for 4 subjects the information about their gender was not known, due to a Prolific situation of
“Data Expired”.
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It took an average of 5′53′′ for subjects to complete the questionnaire, thus making the hourly
payment equal to £8.15 (equivalent to e9.57 or $11.40).
5 Results
We worked out each subjects assessment of the three goods on the basis of the questionnaire
choices in the Multiple List stages, so as to define the variables corresponding to willingness to
pay or willingness to accept for the given good for the given treatment condition. Therefore we
computed the following variables:
XXXBuyer WTP, XXXNow WTA, XXXDay WTA, XXXWeek WTA, XXXMonth WTA
where in turn XXX can be one of “Mug”, “Amazon” and “Spotify”. The resulting mean values
are shown in table 1:
Buyer Now Day Week Month
Mug 3.86 6.51 7.50 6.52 7.58
Amazon 78.38 88.46 92.18 92.93 92.14
Spotify 12.24 16.60 17.15 19.26 17.24
Table 1: Mean values for WTP and WTA at different time scenarios
Preliminary analysis using the Kruskal-Wallis rank-sum test makes it clear that for all three
assets there are effects determined by the various conditions studied and that these effects are
mainly determined by the difference between WTP and (instant) WTA. Indeed (see table 2) the
K-W test rejects the null hypothesis with very low p-values when all 5 conditions are considered,
while it does not reject the null hypothesis when it is applied only to the ”seller” conditions.
Mug Amazon Spotify
Buyer + Seller conditions 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Seller conditions only 0.2818 0.105 0.2499
Table 2: Kruskal-Wallis test: p-values
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One clear feature suggested by these average values is that there is a gap between willingness
to pay for each good when buying and willingness to accept money when selling. Indeed the
following pictures demonstrate the existence of a statistically significant difference for all three
goods.
Concerning the differences between the “Now” evaluation of the WTA and those under dif-
ferent time scenarios (that is between treatment condition 2a and 2b, 2c and 2d) the evidence
is mixed as can be inferred from the following table, where we report outcomes of Wilcoxon
rank-sum test of the null hypothesis of equal median in the distributions of the WTA in the Now
and the Day, Week and Month conditions for the three different goods.
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Day Week Month
Mug 0.066 0.513 0.096
Amazon 0.084 0.014 0.026
Spotify 0.340 0.030 0.329
Table 3: Wilcoxon test for differences wrt to the “Now” WTA: p-values
Inspection of Table 3 does not suggest any clear pattern of how the duration of “possession”
affects the valuation of the objects by the subjects in the virtual context of the questionnaire:
what can be said is that there appear to be differences in the valuation of the three objects
for different durations of ownership. The following three images give a pictorial intuition of
a possible model of behavior in which both an instant endowment effect as well as a long-term
endowment effect are exhibited: the latter, however, lacks the expected characteristics of stability
and regularity.
The results confirm the occurrence of the endowment effect for tangible goods (mug). More-
over, with respect to the two questions in section 2 concerning the dependence of the endowment
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effect on the type of good, we can answer that the endowment effect clearly appears both in
the case of the exchange good (Amazon Gift Card) and in the case of the non-material good
(Spotify).
Instead, with respect to questions concerning the effect of ownership duration on WTA, the
results are less clear. We can observe that the long-term endowment effect does not occur with
the same intensity and timing for the three types of assets. For the mug (tangible good) the
largest effect is observed after one day, while for the Amazon Gift Card (exchange good) and
Spotify (non-material good) the largest effect is observed after one week. The interesting feature
is that in none of the three cases, neither the peak of the WTA is reached at the longest possible
ownership duration, nor do we observe the expected adjustment path to the new equilibrium
value - which we would have imagined with increasing values and decreasing increments in the
transition from one period to the next of longer duration. Indeed the Jonckheere-Terpstra test
for an ordered alternative hypothesis reveals a (strong) statistically significant trend in the data
when all 5 conditions are considered. Instead, when it is applied only to the ”seller” conditions,
the J-T test detect a statistically significant trend only in one case out of three (Amazon) while
the null hypothesis is not rejected for the mug and for Spotify (see table 4 with detailed p-values).
Mug Amazon Spotify
Buyer + Seller conditions 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Seller conditions only 0.2563 0.0299 0.2678
Table 4: Jonckheere-Terpstra test: p-values
Finally, to check whether some demographic attribute played a role in shaping the results, we
perform a linear regression analysis with the WTA of the asset as the dependent variable, the five
ownership conditions, gender, age, and the current country of residence as the predictors. We
also included a dummy variable “Framing”, related to the survey question that asked subjects
whether they felt influenced by the specific framing they faced (see Figure 19 in the appendix)
with the answer “Yes” coded as “1”.
The model is significant (p < 0.01 for all assets). As expected, ownership conditions are the most
important explanatory variables. None of the others seems to play a relevant role. A difference
emerges between the mug and the other two assets. In the case of the mug not all the treatment
variables are significant, while the framing variable is: those who believe they were influenced
by the framing rated the cup - on average - more. On the other hand, for Amazon and Spotify
there is no effect of framing while all the ownership conditions are significant. Also residence in
some countries (Canada, USA and UK) shows some small effects, although marginal and specific
for each of the three goods. Detailed results are shown in Table 5.
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Dependent variable:
Mug WTA Spotify WTA Amazon WTA
(1) (2) (3)
Now 1.300 11.110∗∗∗ 4.730∗∗∗
(0.831) (2.803) (1.578)
Day 2.114∗∗∗ 14.058∗∗∗ 4.700∗∗∗
(0.811) (2.736) (1.541)
Week 0.607 14.369∗∗∗ 6.868∗∗∗
(0.820) (2.766) (1.557)
Month 2.393∗∗∗ 13.953∗∗∗ 5.359∗∗∗
(0.823) (2.776) (1.563)
Framing 2.911∗∗∗ −1.462 1.009
(0.525) (1.771) (0.997)
Male 0.865∗ −1.612 −0.433
(0.513) (1.731) (0.974)
Age 0.007 −0.084 −0.058
(0.028) (0.093) (0.052)
Canada −0.082 3.155 −5.181∗
(1.420) (4.790) (2.697)
Ireland −1.316 −0.292 −2.986
(1.544) (5.209) (2.933)
Italy −1.060 10.305 −1.201
(5.129) (17.306) (9.744)
New Zealand −1.888 −3.088 −2.919
(2.223) (7.501) (4.223)
United Kingdom −2.152∗ −1.815 −3.766
(1.298) (4.380) (2.466)
United States −0.428 −0.122 −3.982∗
(1.243) (4.194) (2.361)
Constant 4.336∗∗∗ 82.583∗∗∗ 17.386∗∗∗
(1.444) (4.873) (2.743)
Observations 394 394 394
R2 0.150 0.110 0.077
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.079 0.046
Residual Std. Error (df = 380) 4.913 16.578 9.334
F Statistic (df = 13; 380) 5.170∗∗∗ 3.606∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5: Regression analysis of assets valuations
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
The results of our analysis are twofold. First, the emergence of the Instant Endowment Effect is
documented for all types of goods. While in the case of tangible goods this is now a unanimously
accepted fact, with respect to both non-tangible goods and exchange goods the literature has
not yet reached consensus conclusions. In particular, the evidence we have documented of an
endowment effect for non-material goods calls into question the fact that this phenomenon must
be primarily attributable to the physical possession of the good itself and not to the abstract
attribution of a property right over it. As far as exchange goods are concerned, so far the
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emergence of the endowment effect was traced back to some form of uncertainty about the value
of the good itself, which in our case is not present since the nominal value of the Amazon voucher
is certain: it remains to be ascertained whether an element of uncertainty may depend on a lack
of familiarity with the electronic marketplace where this voucher can be spent, a hypothesis that
deserves further future investigation.
Second, regarding the effect of prolonged possession on the endowment effect, the results are
less clear. While some upward trend in this effect over time is detected, the results do not exhibit
the regularity patterns we would expect. One possible, obvious inference is that the effects of
prolonged possession may not be unambiguous. On the other hand, these ambiguities could also
be the result of the particular approach we have followed in this paper. Indeed, one possible
explanation for this absence of the expected regularities is that the design of the questionnaire was
not sufficiently effective in inducing in the subjects the necessary identification with the situation
represented. Indeed it is well known that individuals have difficulty predicting the impact that
experienced emotions (affects) may have on their decisions (see Loewenstein et al., 2003 about
the projection bias and Bardsley et al., 2010, §6.4.3 for a more comprehensive discussion), and
the same may be true in our case where the subtle differences induced by prolonged possession
of an asset may be difficult to anticipate in the absence of actual experience.
A second source of disruption, although related to the previous one, might be the absence
of incentives, which are often necessary to motivate subjects toward tasks of higher cognitive
effort such as imagining the consequences of different time scenarios. The large variance of
the data we collected could be a symptom of this fact: for example, Smith and Walker (1993)
and Camerer and Hogarth (1999) show that one of the most robust effects of the presence of
incentives in the experimental setting is to reduce the variance of the data collected, especially
in judgment tasks that are responsive to better effort. These considerations lead us to believe
that an interesting possible development of this study is to organize an incentivized experiment:
many of the questions left unanswered could in this way find an answer.
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7 Appendix: Questionnaire screenshots
1. The following set of 16 screenshots shows the full path presented to participants in the “Buyer”
condition who successfully completed the questionnaire.
Figure 5: Welcome and consent form
17
Figure 6: Buyers’ instructions and comprehension check
18
Figure 7: Mug WTP elicitation, first stage
19
Figure 8: Mug WTP elicitation, second stage, interval 6-9
20
Figure 9: Spotify WTP elicitation, first stage
21
Figure 10: Spotify WTP elicitation, second stage, interval 25-30
22
Figure 11: Amazon WTP elicitation, first stage
23
Figure 12: Amazon WTP elicitation, second stage, interval 80-90
24
Figure 13: Attention check question, buyers’ version
25
Figure 14: Final survey, part 1, question 1
Figure 15: Final survey, part 1, question 2
26
Figure 16: Final survey, part 1, question 3
Figure 17: Final survey, part 1, question 4
27
Figure 18: Final survey, part 2, consent
28
Figure 19: Final survey, part 2, question 1, buyers’ version
29
Figure 20: Final survey, part 2, question 2, buyers’ version
30
2. The following set of 6 screenshots shows examples of the alternative versions for the
instructions, choice page, and attention check in the other treatment conditions.
Figure 21: Sellers’ instructions and comprehension check
31
Figure 22: Mug WTA elicitation, first stage
32
Figure 23: Mug WTA elicitation, one day ownership, first stage
33
Figure 24: Mug WTA elicitation, one week ownership, first stage
34
Figure 25: Mug WTA elicitation, one month ownership, first stage
35
Figure 26: Attention check question, sellers’ version
36
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